Despite Northwest being the launch customer for the Boeing 747-400, in the mid-2000s it was clear that at some point the fleet would need to be replaced- and Airbus had already succeeded at the beginning of the decade in taking Boeing’s most logical offering off the table, the widebody 777 family, by virtue of their winning the competition that saw A330s form the core of NWA’s trans-Atlantic fleet.
The A330 family at that time did not have the range, and certainly not the capacity, of the 747-400, and Airbus’ four-engined, longer-stage-length A340 had not become a strong-selling 747 replacement. But with much fanfare the airframer had developed its double-decker A380 that offered even more capacity than the 747-400 and similar range – assuming that key hub airports would become increasingly constrained, and that airlines would desire to upgauge service if they were unable to add frequencies.
Northwest’s strategic hub at Tokyo-Narita would have been one of these operationally-constrained airports, in Airbus’ view: the windows of trans-Pacific departure and arrival times to allow for connecting flight banks outside of noise curfew hours were limited resources. This was Airbus’ sales pitch to NWA, and given the genial relationship the companies enjoyed, Northwest gave the proposal thorough consideration. One of Airbus’ demonstrator aircraft visited Minneapolis/St. Paul in November 2007 so that airline and airport staff could get a firsthand look and assess their respective servicing and operational readiness to operate the type.
However, NWA had already reached a different conclusion from Airbus – and chose to order the much smaller Boeing 787-8. Northwest had configured its North American hubs of Minneapolis, Detroit, and Memphis to handle multiple-daily frequency long haul operations on core routes – and saw that the 787 could overfly Tokyo to directly connect other key centers such as Shanghai, Singapore, and Seoul. This would free NWA from having to use half its limited Tokyo slots for intra-Asia flights that fed the massive 747s, which had to be sold at a discount. Instead, with the 787, Northwest could use all its Tokyo slots for point-to-point premium service to North America and not have to worry about selling as many seats for each flight.
The A380s gigantic passenger decks (and underdeveloped cargo capacity) would have posed an even bigger balancing and yield problem for Northwest at Tokyo-Narita. Despite the A380 being more fuel-efficient than the 747-400, NWA would have struggled to service the debt needed to acquire these aircraft. It is telling that neither Japan Air Lines nor ANA-All Nippon ordered the A380 (ANA finally took 3 A380s to handle Hawaiian tourist routes just as the COVID crisis started, as part of a complicated takeover deal of a failed smaller Japanese carrier.)
Delta ultimately did call on Airbus to replace the 747-400, with a combination of new A350-900 flagships, and lo and behold, A330s (in the type’s ultimate form, the long-range A330-900.)
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