Bonanza’s embrace of the turboprop Fairchild F-27 through 1959 and 1960, and disposal of smaller, slower Douglas DC-3s profoundly improved the company’s economics and competitive position. By the end of 1962, Bonanza achieved the highest passenger load factor of all scheduled airlines in the U.S. (not just Regional carriers!) Its Las Vegas hub connected the major points of Salt Lake City, Reno, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Phoenix with milk-run stops at smaller communities across the Desert Southwest, often competing on its trunk routes with Major carriers like Western, United, American, and TWA.
As the Major carriers started to introduce higher-capacity propjets, like the Lockheed Electra 188, or turbojets like Douglas DC-8s and Boeing 707s, Ed Converse and his team anticipated travelers would prefer the larger and faster equipment and erode Bonanza’s business. Also, the Phoenix – Salt Lake City nonstop was one of the longest scheduled F-27 flights at the time, tying up equipment which would have been better used on shorter hauls and leaving room for falling passenger satisfaction.
In 1962, Bonanza concluded jet equipment would be necessary not just to remain competitive but to generate the kinds of profits that would allow their government subsidy for serving smaller towns to be reduced. This logic was sound when the F-27 order was placed, and the Federal loan guarantee proved sensible. With no U.S. airframe manufacturer offering a smaller-capacity, short-to-medium range jetliner, Bonanza was forced to look overseas, and found the U.K.’s promising new entry, the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) One-Eleven, most acceptable. The Series 200 version of this twin-jet would seat 79 passengers and have a range of up to 830 miles, a fine step up from the F-27. Further confidence came from Rolls-Royce producing the 1-11’s Spey jet turbines, and Bonanza was quite happy with the Rolls-Royce Dart turboprops on the F-27. BAC had already secured a breakthrough order in the United States in 1962 from Braniff, and another win from northeastern Regional carrier Mohawk, so spare parts and airframe support were going to be well-covered. An order was placed in November for three airframes, and Bonanza petitioned the Civil Aeronautics Board for a loan guarantee as insurance on the jets’ financing.
By the end of 1962, however, the C.A.B. was under political pressure to stem the rush toward foreign suppliers – as Western had also signed an order for 1-11s, and Ozark and Frontier were also ready to make commitments. Douglas in particular needed more time to refine their DC-9 design. The C.A.B. rejected Bonanza’s application in February 1963, claiming the carrier would need subsidies to operate jets, and that American subsidy dollars should be spent on American-built aircraft. Especially in retrospect, this assertion was clearly nonsense – but it did its job: Western cancelled its order; Bonanza and Ozark waited another two years to acquire DC-9s, and Frontier opted for the new Boeing 737.
BAC still found success in America, with a top-up order from Braniff, a major sale to American, a large fleet placed with Mohawk that continued to serve with Allegheny, and a batch delivered to Aloha. Would Bonanza have ordered more than three frames ultimately, and petitioned for different routes if they had jets two years early? Would 1-11s be painted in the yellow Hughes Airwest livery? We will never know – though it is fun to speculate.
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